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American constitutionalism has elaborated the realizable rules 
and formal rationality of Roman laW94 into a full-blown, self-con-
tained system of social morality. In America as in Rome, the 
legal apparatus of the secular state continues to ask, "What is 
truth?"9s Powell's accomplishment is a powerful demonstration 
that neither twenty centuries of legal evolution nor twenty de-
cades of American constitutionalism bring Caesar any closer to 
answering this question on his own. 
BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRE-
SENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CON-
GRESS. By Carol M. Swain.1 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 275. 
Daniel A. Farbef'2 
For the past twenty years, the federal courts have been vig-
orously engaged in racial redistricting. Recently, this involve-
ment was attacked by the only black member of the current 
Court. In his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hal/,3 Justice 
Thomas challenged the conceptual basis for race-based reappor-
tionment. A contrary view, represented by writers such as Lani 
Guinier, is that current judicial efforts do not go nearly far 
enough. This viewpoint is exemplified by Randall Kennedy's 
harsh review of Black Faces, Black Interests in Reconstruction.4 
Notably, this debate about redistricting is not merely taking place 
between blacks and whites but also among blacks themselves-
Kennedy, Guinier, and Swain are all African American. 
Unlike many other contributions to this debate, the Swain 
book is richly empirical. Besides the multiple-regression analy-
ses that are the staple of modem social science, Professor Swain 
presents the results of several years of patient interviews with 
94. See generally Rudolph von Jhering, Der Geist Des Romischen Rechts § 4, at 50-
55 (1883). 
95. John 18:38. 
1. Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, 
Princeton University. 
2. Associate Dean of Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota. Although I haven't burdened this review with citations to their work, my 
knowledge of this area is based largely on the work of Kathryn Abrams, Phil Frickey, 
Lani Guinier, and Sam lssacharoff. 
3. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994). 
4. Randall Kennedy, BIJJclcs in Congress: Carol Swain's Critique, 2:2 Reconstruc-
tion 34 (1993). 
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black and white members of the U.S. House and their staffs. In 
this review, I will try to situate Swain's book within this ongoing 
debate. Part I of the review will explore the ongoing normative 
debate about the nature of representation, a debate in which 
Swain's views seem midway between those of Thomas and Ken-
nedy. Part II will consider her empirical conclusions and how 
they relate to the normative debate. 
I 
To understand the debate over racial reapportionment, some 
understanding of legal doctrine is essential. As a constitutional 
matter, intentional racial discrimination is impermissible in redis-
tricting as elsewhere. But under Washington v. Davis,s unin-
tended impacts on blacks, no matter how severe, do not receive 
serious constitutional scrutiny. The statutory story is more com-
plex. Under the original 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Attorney 
General could veto new laws in certain jurisdictions having the 
purpose or effect of interfering with black voting. As construed 
by the Supreme Court, this provision extended beyond voting 
procedures to include all electoral issues, such as apportionment. 
Lower courts allowed similar statutory challenges to existing laws 
to be brought by private citizens, and some important rulings rec-
ognized a cause of action for "vote dilution." The Supreme 
Court initially rejected these lower court decisions,6 but Congress 
repudiated the Court's interpretation.? 
As currently amended, the statute allows private suits to be 
brought without a showing of intentional discrimination. Virtu-
ally everyone agrees that the amendment was intended to allow 
suit for vote dilution. Congress was unable, however, to provide 
any real definition of vote dilution, although it did eschew any 
mandate of proportional representation. The courts have strug-
gled ever since to clarify the concept of vote dilution; perhaps the 
only thing that is really clear is that the plaintiff must demon-
strate the existence of racial bloc voting.s 
As a result of actual or potential litigation, redistricting is 
now conducted with an eye to avoiding claims of vote dilution, 
which in practice has sometimes meant the drawing of tortur-
ously complex district lines in order to maximize black voting 
strength. Liberals applaud this practice as a remedy for decades 
5. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
6. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
7. VRA Amendments of 1982. 
8. See Thornburg v. Gringles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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of political subordination. The Court has generally acquiesced in 
this enterprise, but in one decision found a state guilty of uncon-
stitutional racial gerrymandering.9 Conservatives consider the 
whole project a particularly nefarious form of affirmative action, 
which they would like to jettison. 
This brings us back to Justice Thomas's concurrence in 
Holder. The narrow issue before the Court was whether the Vot-
ing Rights Act applies to a change in the size of a governing 
body, when that change has the likely effect of reducing black 
representation. Justice Thomas used the case, however, as an oc-
casion to rethink the entire issue of racial gerrymandering. He 
argued, not very persuasively, that the statute was never intended 
to cover electoral issues such as apportionment-an argument 
that might conceivably have been valid in 1965 but now comes 
many years too late.to Our present concern, however, is not with 
this question of statutory interpretation but rather with Thomas's 
broader attack on the idea of vote dilution. 
The first prong of Thomas's critique relates to the concept of 
representation. There are various theories of representation, he 
pointed out, with a variety of implications for vote-dilution cases. 
At least under one tenable theory of representation, a group 
need not be a majority for its interests to be represented: "in a 
two-party system such as ours, the influence of a potential 'swing' 
group of voters composing 10% to 20% of the electorate in a 
given district can be considerable."n Under another theory of 
representation, only formal access to the polls is necessary: 
Some conceptions of representative government may primar-
ily emphasize the formal value of the vote as a mechanism for 
participation in the electoral process, whether it results in con-
trol of a seat or not. Under such a theory, minorities unable to 
control elected posts would not be considered essentially with-
out a vote; rather, a vote duly cast and counted would be 
deemed just as 'effective' as any other. If a minority group is 
unable to control seats, that result may plausibly be attributed 
to the inescapable fact that, in a majoritarian system, numeri-
cal minorities lose elections.12 
Without any constitutional or statutory grounding for choosing a 
particular theory of representation, Thomas concluded, the 
9. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
10. For a response to his arguments, see Justice Stevens's separate opinion in 
Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2625. 
11. 114 S. Ct. at 2596 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
12. ld. 
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Court has no way of determining when a group is properly repre-
sented and when its influence has been diluted. 
The second prong of Thomas's attack challenged the as-
sumption that "racial groups can be conceived of largely as polit-
ical interest groups," an assumption he said "should be 
repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind 
Constitution."t3 The logical and unacceptable implication of cur-
rent law, he suggested, would be a racial register, in which mem-
bers of each racial group would be identified so they could vote 
separately for representatives of their own group. In Thomas's 
view, the effect of racial redistricting may well be to increase the 
racial polarization of politics. 
Taken on its own terms, Thomas's concurrence makes some 
persuasive arguments. We have not reached the point at which 
racially drawn districts swerve to include or exclude particular 
households, but some of the more byzantine boundaries some-
times seem to be plotted almost in the same spirit. The analogy 
to the racial registry is overdrawn but not entirely inapt, and 
apart from die-hard segregationists and some black nationalists, 
the registry idea would be almost universally repugnant. More-
over, Thomas is clearly correct about the theoretical difficulty of 
defining the adequacy of representation. Suppose we wanted to 
know whether farmers or the elderly were properly represented 
in Congress. It would be hard to know where to begin in making 
this determination about the members of these groups. Still, the 
historic situation of blacks in America seems quite clearly dis-
tinct from that of other groups in a way that Thomas's analysis 
seems to ignore. 
The opposing view animates Randall Kennedy's review of 
the Swain book. The crux of Kennedy's position is found in the 
following paragraph: 
Swain's final and most general objection to race conscious 
districting aimed at enhancing black representation is that 
"[r]ace relations suffer when 'electoral remedies' favor one ra-
cial group over another." This understanding of the issue, 
with its implicit belief that existing majoritarian procedures 
are race neutral and fair, is pervasive, influential, wrong-
headed, and disasterous for efforts to create a more racially 
just polity. So long as racial group competition constitutes an 
important aspect of American social dynamics, any and every 
electoral procedure will either favor one group or another. 
Existing electoral rules, with their strong majoritarian bias, 
13. Id. at 2598. 
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strongly favor whites in electoral competition for the great ma-
jority of seats in Congress. The race conscious districting to 
which Swain objects constitutes a partial exception to that tilt, 
an exception which "favors" blacks only in the sense that it 
somewhat mitigates the disadvantage of white majoritarian 
dominance.14 
617 
On one reading, this strongly worded passage seems to assert 
that majority rule is inherently unfair to minority groups. That is, 
it seems to be a square rejection of what Justice Thomas terms a 
central aspect of democracy: "numerical minorities lose elec-
tions."ts It was this kind of interpretation of her work that led to 
Lani Guinier's demise as a nominee.t6 If given this interpreta-
tion, Kennedy's argument is rather vulnerable to the critiques 
Thomas sets forth in Holder. 
In context, however, Kennedy's argument is open to another 
interpretation. His discussion of the role of racial considerations 
in the design of electoral systems begins with the comment that 
"Swain seriously minimizes the extent to which white voters and 
politicians, on the basis of race, resist the empowering of black 
voters and politicians."t7 This comment is followed by a lengthy 
discussion of a racist gerrymander in Georgia in 198Q,ts It seems 
at least possible, therefore, that Kennedy's argument really turns 
on the existence of racist motivation rather than being a general 
rejection of the inevitable arithmetic of majority rule. If this is 
the argument Kennedy means to be making, it remains undevel-
oped, but it is interesting to consider how a motive-based defense 
of vote dilution claims could be elaborated. 
Such an argument might begin with one of the central norms 
of American constitutional law: governmental decisions cannot 
be based on theories of racial inferiority. Despite its virtually 
unquestioned status, however, this norm is seriously under-
enforced by Courts in three respects. First and most obviously, 
proof of malignant intent is difficult. Inevitably, many actions by 
legislators and administrators evade successful litigation. It was 
for this reason that Congress empowered the Attorney General 
to veto changes in voting laws without proof of discriminatory 
14. Kennedy, 2:2 Reconstruction at 40 (cited in note 4). 
15. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
16. In my opinion, Guinier's argument was actually much more subtle and should 
not have been a barrier to her confirmation. 
17. Kennedy, 2:2 Reconstruction at 38 (cited in note 4). 
18. Swain herself devotes only a page to this litigation. Kennedy's criticism of her 
discussion of the litigation seems well-founded. In general, she is not at her best in dis-
cussing specific legal issues, which is not surprising since she is a political scientist rather 
than a lawyer. 
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intent. Second, proof of intent is particularly problematic when 
legislative inaction is involved. Yet what a legislature leaves un-
disturbed is just as important as what it changes. Undoubtedly, 
this was part of the reason for the amendment extending the "ef-
fects" test to existing electoral schemes (as opposed to changes in 
voting rules). Finally-and most likely to be overlooked-one 
set of governmental actions is exempt from judicial scrutiny: the 
decisions of individual voters. Although we do not customarily 
consider them to be a form of "state action," these decisions 
clearly are not part of the private sphere. The Court has held 
that the participation of private attorneys in the selection of a 
jury is state action; surely the selection of a governor or a state 
senator is equally a part of governance.t9 Even if most white vot-
ers are immune to racist motivations, a sufficient number of rac-
ists may exist to skew election results unconstitutionally. Yet it is 
inconceivable for courts to supervise the motives of individual 
voters.2o In short, we can expect legislative policy outcomes to 
be distorted on occasion by racist motivations at various levels: 
the distortions are clearly unconstitutional but resistant to judi-
cial correction. 
Thus, direct judicial efforts to enforce the anti-racism norm 
are seriously underinclusive. Discriminatory motive must there-
fore be attacked less directly. In this regard, redistricting and 
other electoral reforms serve dual functions. They can create 
countervailing power by ensuring that black interests are well 
represented in the legislature. Also, they can attempt to mini-
mize the influence of racist-motivated white voting by preventing 
bloc-voting against blacks. This is a classic remedial argument. 
It doesn't require the recognition of any new constitutional right 
to group representation, but only seeks to remedy the effects on 
governance of undoubtedly improper racist motives.21 
Such an argument would not be vulnerable to Justice 
Thomas's criticisms, for it does not require courts to recognize 
group entitlements to political power or to define the concept of 
adequate representation. It might well also be acceptable to Pro-
fessor Swain, who seems quite at home with the idea that black 
interests need full representation in the political process. In prin-
ciple, in other words, this interpretation (or modification) of 
19. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
20. See Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986). 
21. Cf. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
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Kennedy's argument ought to be broadly acceptable.22 Note, 
however, that the argument is keyed to ensuring the influence of 
black interests on legislation, not necessarily to increasing the 
number of black legislators. Yet reapportionment efforts seem 
directed largely at the latter goal. This makes it crucial to investi-
gate the strength of the connection between the two goals. 
II 
The previous section presented an argument for race-based 
apportionment as a remedy for discriminatory legislation. To be 
effective, however, this remedy requires that the legislators 
elected from majority-black districts be particularly likely to rep-
resent black interests. Since at present all of the legislators from 
majority-black districts are themselves black, we can narrow our 
empirical inquiry to black representatives. 
Do black legislators have any particular tendency to repre-
sent the interests of black voters? This is a topic of heated dis-
pute between Swain and Kennedy. Swain is particularly 
skeptical about the quality of representation with respect to his-
torically black districts (which are typically inner-city). She 
quotes one black representative as saying, "One of the advan-
tages, and disadvantages, of representing blacks is their shame-
less loyalty to their incumbents. You can almost get away with 
raping babies and be forgiven. You don't have any vigilance 
about your performance." Her position on this issue is a central 
focus of Kennedy's critique. He characterizes her argument as 
resting on "impressionistic comparisons that are all too often 
conclusory and non-verifiable."23 
Kennedy focuses on Swain's narrow argument that black 
representatives from one specific type of district lack accounta-
bility. Even on this limited point, her evidence is a bit better 
than he suggests. Apart from recounting the views of seemingly 
knowledgeable black politicians, she adduces the following addi-
tional evidence. First, a study by leading political scientists con-
cluded that "blacks consider policymaking the least important of 
a representative's activities; in their view, it lags behind helping 
constituents and protecting the district." Presumably, voters with 
this view will impose less constraint on a legislator's positions. 
Second, blacks seem to enjoy a greater incumbency effect than 
22. For an earlier argument linking racial apportionment with the limits of the intent 
text, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Racism, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 325, 358-64 (1992). 
23. Kennedy, 2:2 Reconstruction at 38 (cited in note 4). 
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white legislators, as measured by reelection success. "Almost all 
black members of Congress, unless they represent nonblack dis-
tricts, are returned to office with high reelection margins that 
come from a tiny fraction of the electorate." Third, black legisla-
tors seem to feel free to take positions without great concern for 
their popularity with the electorate. This is partly reflected by 
the broad range of ideologies embraced by various representa-
tives of similar black districts. It is also suggested by the fact that 
a majority of the black representatives in 1989 voted for a large 
congressional pay raise, which was so highly unpopular with the 
electorate that only 8% of white representatives voted for it. 
This evidence is certainly far from definitive, but it does suggest 
that heavily black constituencies exert less pressure on the policy 
positions taken by black representatives than white constituen-
cies do on their representatives. 
In any event, the real question is whether black legislators 
are more likely in the end than white legislators to represent 
black interests within the legislative process. Swain is dubious. 
Besides mustering considerable anecdotal evidence on this score, 
she presents some more rigorous statistical evidence. As a gauge 
of black interests, she uses a battery of legislative assessments by 
interest groups such as civil rights organizations. By using this 
measure, she gives the benefit of the doubt to liberal advocates 
of racial redistricting by adopting their own concept of black in-
terests. In one regression analysis, she found that by far the 
strongest predictor of support for black interests (so defined) was 
party affiliation. Political party far outweighed district character-
istics such as region, urban status, or minority percentage. She 
then examined levels .of support while holding district composi-
tion constant, and found that "[r]egardless of the percentage of 
blacks in their districts, almost all white Democrats are support-
ive of black interests. For the Republicans, it is their party and 
not the number of their black constituents that guides them 
politically. "24 
24. Swain devotes particular attention to whites who are associate members of the 
Black Caucus. Their records on racial issues tend to be indistinguishable from those of 
black representatives, but they are not full members of the Caucus. One of these white 
associate members tells the following amusing story: 
I didn't know that an associate member couldn't go into a regular Black Caucus 
meeting, that it was just for full members only. And so they had a Black Caucus 
meeting and I went to it, and I noticed everybody was real nice, but ~ere was a 
lot of scratching their heads. And so when I came out of the meetmg, Marva 
said: "What were you doing in that meeting? Didn't you know you weren't sup-
posed to be there-white people aren't supposed to be in that meeting!" I said: 
"No, Marva, you're wrong. That fellow Gus Hawkins from California was in 
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The other regression analysis focused on the race of the rep-
resentative. It found no statistical difference between the posi-
tions of black and white representatives, once political party and 
region were taken into account. Looking specifically at Demo-
crats, she found only a "shade of difference" between white and 
black Democrats. In short, she concludes, "partisanship and re-
gion are far more important than race in predicting whether rep-
resentatives will pursue black interests" as conventionally 
defined. Again, these results cannot be regarded as definitive, 
but neither should they be ignored. 
The upshot is that the support for the interest-representation 
theory seems somewhat shaky.zs Increasing the number of black 
legislators appears weakly linked with strengthening the weight 
given by the legislature to black interests. Perhaps support for 
the continued recognition of vote dilution claims should primar-
ily look elsewhere. One possibility is that black legislators serve 
important functions for black constituents other than exerting 
policy inftuence.26 They function as a symbol of acceptance and 
empowerment. The importance of such symbols should not be 
overlooked in light of the high level of alienation felt by many 
blacks. Black representatives may also help deliver badly needed 
constituent services to a population that has little other leverage. 
Swain's accounts of discussions with these legislators makes it 
clear that they take service to their constituents very seriously. 
So should we, given the pressing needs of many of those constitu-
ents. Also, just as blacks ought to be entitled to equal access to 
other careers, they deserve equal opportunity to pursue political 
careers. 
Thus, there may well be other reasons to explore redistrict-
ing or devices such as cumulative voting that would allow black 
constituents to elect more black legislators. But Swain's evi-
dence casts some doubt on the argument that such electoral 
changes will increase the weight given to black interests in the 
creation of public policy. 
there." Marva said: "Congressman, he's black!" "No he's not!" I said. "Yes, he 
is!" Marva replied. I felt like a fool. 
25. Swain's study is limited to members of Congress. State or local representatives 
may well be subject to different dynamics. See Kenneth Mladenka, Blacks and Hispanics 
in Urban Politics, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 165 (1989). 
26. Other possible benefits of electing black representatives are explored in Lani 
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Elec-
toral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1103-12 (1991). 
